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Abstract In this paper we address the problem of aggregating outranking state-
ments from multiple preference criteria of ordinal significance. The concept of
ordinal concordance of a global outranking situation is defined and an operational
test for its presence is developed. Finally, we propose a new kind of robustness
analysis for global outranking statements integrating classical dominance, ordinal
and classical majority concordance in a same ordinal valued logical framework.
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Introduction
In multicriteria decision aid methodology, and more particularly in the outranking
methods, the problem of aggregating preference statements along multiple points
of view is commonly solved with the help of cardinal weights translating the im-
portance the decision maker gives each point of view (Roy, 1985, 1991). However,
determining the exact numerical values of these weights remains one of the most
obvious practical difficulties in applying outranking methods (Roy and Mousseau,
1996). Similar problems arise in the MAUT methodology (see Zeleny, 1982), but
we shall here concentrate essentially on the outranking methodology.
To cope with the difficulty of measuring the exact numerical importance of
each point of view in a given decision problem, we extend in a first section the
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majority concordance principle – as implemented in theELECTREmethods (Roy,
1985, 1991) – to the context where merely ordinal information concerning the
relative weights of the criteria is available. Basic data and notation is introduced
and the classical outranking concept is adapted to our purpose. The ordinal con-
cordance principle is formally introduced and illustrated on a simple car selection
problem.
In a second section, we address the theoretical foundation of our definition of
ordinal concordance. In addition, an operational test for assessing the truthfulness
of an ordinally concordant outranking statement is developed. The core approach
involves the construction of a distributional dominance test similar in its design to
the stochastic dominance approach.
In a third section we finally address the general robustness problem of valued
outranking statements. Classical dominance, i.e. unanimous concordance, ordinal
as well as simple majority concordance, are considered altogether in a common
logical framework in order to achieve robust optimal choice recommendations.
We rely in this approach on recent work of us on good choices methodology from
ordinal valued outranking relations (see Bisdorff and Roubens, 2004).
1 The ordinal concordance principle
We start with setting up the necessary notation and definitions. Here we more or
less follow the notation used in the French multicriteria decision aid community.
1.1 Basic data and notation
As starting point, we require a setA of potential decision actions. To assess binary
outranking situations between these actions we consider a consistent familyF =
{g1, . . . , gn} of n preference criteria (Roy and Bouyssou, 1993, Chapter 2). The






A first illustration – shown in Table 1 – concerns a simple car selection problem
taken from Vincke (1992, pp. 61–62)). We consider here a setA = {m1, . . . ,m7}
of seven potential car models which are evaluated on four criteria:P ce, Comfort,
SpeedandDesign. In this supposedly consistent family of criteria, thePricecrite-
rion works in the negative direction of the numerical amounts. The evaluations on
the qualitative criteria such asComfort, SpeedandDesignare numerically coded
as follows: 3 meansexcellentor superior, 2 meansaverageor ordinary, 1 means
weak.
In general, we may observe on each criteriongj ∈ F an indifference threshold
qj > 0, a strict preference thresholdpj > qj and a veto thresholdvj > pj . (see
Roy and Bouyssou, 1993, pp. 55–59). We suppose for instance that the decision-
maker admits on thePrice criterion an indifference threshold of10, a preference
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Table 1.Car selection problem: performance tableau
Cars qj pj vj m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 w
1: Price 10 50 150 300 270 250 210 200 180 150 5/15
2: Comfort 0 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 4/15
3: Speed 0 1 – 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3/15
4: Design 0 1 – 3 3 3 1 3 2 2 3/15
Source:Vincke, Ph. 1992, pp. 61–62
threshold of50 and a veto threshold of150 units. On theComfort criterion we
express a veto against the global outranking of a weakly comfortable against a
superior comfortable car.
To simplify the formal exposition, we consider in the sequel that all criteria
support the decision maker’s preferences along a positive direction. Let∆j(a, b) =
gj(a)− gj(b) denote the difference between the performances of the decision ac-
tions a andb on criteriongj . On each criteriongj ∈ F , we denote “aCj b” the
semiotic restriction of assertion “a is evaluated at least as good asb” to the indi-
vidual criteriongj .
Definition 1 (Local preference assessment).
∀a, b,∈ A, the level of credibilityr(aCj b) of assertion “aCj b” is defined as:
r(aCj b) =

1 if ∆j(a, b) > −qj
pj+∆j(a,b)
pj−qj if − pj 6 ∆j(a, b) 6 −qj
0 if ∆j(a, b) < −pj .
(1)
The level of credibilityr(aCj b) associated with the truthfulness of the negation
of the assertion “aCj b” is defined as follows:
r(aCj b) = 1− r(aCj b). (2)
Following these definitions, we find in Table 1 that modelm6 is clearly eval-
uated at least as good as modelm2 on thePrice criterion (∆1(m6,m2) = 90
andr(m6 S1 m2) = 1) as well as on theSpeedcriterion (∆3(m6,m2) = 1 and
r(m6 S3 m2) = 1).
Inversely, modelm2 is also clearly evaluated at least as good as modelm6 on
theComfortcriterion as well as on theDesigncriterion. Indeed∆2(m2,m6) = 2
so thatr(m2 C2 m6) = 1 and∆4(m2,m6) = 1 givesr(m2 S4 m6) = 1.
A given performance tableau, if constructed as required by the corresponding
decision aid methodology (see Roy, 1985), is warrant for the truthfulness of these
“ local”, i.e. individual criterion based preferences of the decision maker. How-
ever, to assess global preference situations integrating all available criteria, we
need to aggregate these local warrants by considering the relative importance the
decision-maker attributes to each individual preference dimension with respect to
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his global preference system. For an individual preference dimension, this impor-
tance is captured by the relativesignificance, which takes the criterion function
modelling the preferences along this dimension. Such a criterion function is work-
ing – in a Peircean sense1 – as aniconic signof the local outranking situation.
The relative importance of the preference dimension modelled by the criterion is
translated by the relativesignificancethis particular icon takes in warranting the
truthfulness of a global outranking statement2.
1.2 The majority concordance principle
In the ELECTRE based methods, assessing the global outranking situation is ad-
dressed by evaluating if, yes or no, amore or less significantmajority of criteria
effectively agree on supporting a given global “at least as good” assertion and,
whether no local veto is expressed against it (see Roy and Bouyssou, 1993; Bis-
dorff, 2002). This outranking approach for assessing aggregated preferences from
multiple criteria was originally introduced by Roy (1968, 1991).
Definition 2 (Concordant outranking index).
Let w = (w1, ..., wn) be a set of significance weights corresponding to then
criteria such that:0 6 wj 6 1 and
∑n
j=1 wj = 1. For a, b ∈ A, let aC b denote
the assertion that “a concordantly outranksb”. We denoterw(aC b) the level of





wj · r(aCj b)
)
. (3)
Assertion “aC b” is consideredrather true than false, as soon as the weighted
sum of criterial significance in favour of the global outranking statement obtains a
strict majority, i.e. the weighted sum of criterial significance is greater than50%.
Following the general definition of an outranking situation (see Roy, 1985),
we shall combine the concordant outranking test with a non veto test.
Definition 3 (Global outranking index).
Let “aS b” denote, as usual in the outranking methods, the assertion that “a
(globally) outranksb” and let “ aD b” denote the fact that there exists a veto ex-
pressed against assertionaS b, i.e.∃ gj ∈ F such that∆j(a, b) 6 −vj . We denote
1 See C.S. Peirce,Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs. In Buchler (ed.) (1955).
2 The significance of a criterion function differs from the concept of importance of a criterion as
arising in the MAUT context (Zeleny, 1982), where the criterion function is not an icon but a conven-
tional symbolic construction, a utility measure. The importance of the individual preference dimension
in the global utility measure is taken into account with specific importance weights based on utility
substitution rates.
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rw(aC b) if (aD b) ;
0 otherwise.
(4)
Credibility of the global outranking assertion is given by the concordant outrank-
ing level if there does not exist any veto expressed against it. Otherwise, the out-
ranking credibility is put to zero3.
To clearly show the truth-functional denotation implied by the credibility func-
tion rw, we introduce some further notations. Letw represent a given set of signif-
icance weights.
Definition 4 (Truth denotation of the outranking index).
We denoteJaS bKw the truth-functional evaluation of assertion “aS b” based on
the outranking indexrw(aS b) and taking its values in a three valued truth domain
L3 = {fw, u, tw} where:fw meansrather false than trueconsidering importance




tw if ( rw(aS b) > 0.5 ) ;
fw if ( rw(aS b) < 0.5 ) ;
u otherwise.
(5)
In Definition 4, we do not follow the traditionalELECTRE methodology which
introduces for this purpose the concept of confidence levels of the outranking in-
dex, a further rather delicate parameter to fix in practical applications. From recent
theoretical results of ours we know indeed that there is no operational need to in-
troduce – apart from the 50% cut as illustrated in Equation 5 above – any higher
cut levelss in order to effectively construct good choice or ranking recommenda-
tions (see Bisdorff and Roubens, 2004).
In our example, let us suppose that the decision-maker admits the significance
weightsw shown in Table 1. ThePricecriterion is the most significant one with a
weight of5/15. Then comes theComfortcriterion with4/15 and finally, both the
Speedand theDesigncriteria have identical weights of3/15. By assuming that
the underlying family of criteria is indeed consistent, we may state that assertion
“m4 Sw m2” with aggregated significance of53.3% is rather true than falsewith
respect to the given importance weightsw. Due to the given veto thresholds, we
may also observe that both “extreme” models, namelym1 – the most expensive
and comfortable one, andm7 – the cheapest and less comfortable one – appear
in fact incomparable. A veto is triggered one way by the too important aPrice
difference:∆1(m1,m7) = 150 > v1 andrw(m1 Sm7) = 0; and, the other way
3 For simplicity of the exposition, we may neglect here that in principle the severeness of the veto
should depend on the level of the concordance (see Roy and Bouyssou, 1993).
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round, by the too important aComfortdifference:∆2(m7,m1) = −2 6 −v2 so
that equallyrw(m7 Sm1) = 0.
The majority concordance approach obviously requires a precise numerical
measurement of the significance of the criteria, a situation which appears to be
difficult to achieve in practical applications of multicriteria decision aid. Substan-
tial efforts have been concentrated on developing analysis and methods for assess-
ing these cardinal significance weights (see Roy and Mousseau, 1992, 1996). Fol-
lowing this discussion, Dias and Clı́maco (2002) propose to cope with imprecise
significance weights by delimiting sets of potential significance weights and en-
riching the proposed decision recommendations with a tolerance to achieve robust
recommendations.
In this paper, we shall not contribute directly to this issue but rely on the fact
that in practical applications the ordinal weighting of the significance of the criteria
is generally easier to assess and more robust than any precise numerical measure-
ment.
1.3 The ordinal concordance principle
Let us assume that instead of a given cardinal weight vectorw we observe a com-
plete pre-orderπ on the family of criteriaF which represents the significance rank
each criterion takes in the evaluation of the concordance of the global outranking
relationS to be constructed onA.
In our previous car selection example, we may notice for instance that the
proposed significance weights model the following pre-order:Price > Comfort
> { Speed, Design}.
A precise set of numerical weights may now be compatible or not with such a
given significance ranking of the criteria.
Definition 5 (π-compatibility).
A given setw = {wi|gi ∈ F} of significance weights is called aπ-compatible if
and only if:
wi = wj for all ordered pairs(gi, gj) of criteria which are of the same signif-
icance with respect toπ;
wi > wj for all couples(gi, gj) of criteria such that criteriongi is certainly
more significant than criteriongj in the sense ofπ.
We denoteW (π) the set of allπ-compatible weight setsw.
Definition 6 (Ordinal concordance).
For a, b ∈ A, let “aCπ b” denote the fact that“a concordantly outranksb with a
significant majority for everyπ-compatible weight setw” .(
rw(aC b) > 0.5, ∀w ∈ W (π)
)
⇒ a Cπ b. (6)
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In other words, theaCπ b situation is given if for allπ-compatible weight setsw,
the level of concordance of assertionaC b outranks the level of concordance of its
negationaC b.
Proposition 1.(
rw(aC b) > rw(aC b); ∀w ∈ W (π)
)
⇒ aCπ b. (7)
Proof. Implication (7) results immediately from the observation that:∑
gj∈F
wj · r(aCj b) >
∑
gj∈F
wj · r(aCj b) ⇔
∑
gj∈F




Indeed,∀gj ∈ F we observe thatr(aCj b)+r(aCj b) = 1. This fact implies that:∑
gj∈F
wj · r(aCj b) +
∑
gj∈F
wj · r(aCj b) = 1.
Coming back to our previous car selection problem, we shall later on verify
that modelm6 effectively outranks all other car models following the ordinal con-
cordance principle. With anyπ-compatible set of cardinal weights, modelm6 will
always concordantly outrank all these car models with a ’significant’ majority of
criteria.
A constructive approach for computing such ordinal concordance statements
is still needed.
2 Testing for ordinal concordance
In this section, we elaborate general conditions that must be fulfilled in order to
ensure an ordinal concordance in favour of a global outranking statement.
2.1 Positive and negative significance distributions
The following implication results from the definition of the ordinal concordance
principle (see Definition 6) and from Proposition 1.(
rw(aC b)−rw(aC b) > rw(aC b)−rw(aC b);∀w ∈ W (π)
)
⇒ aCπ b. (8)
The inequality on the left hand side of implication (8) gives us the operational
key for implementing a test for ordinal concordance of an outranking situation. The
same weightswj and−wj , denoting the “confirming”, respectively the “negat-
ing”, significance of each criterion, appear on each side of this inequality. Fur-
thermore, the sum of the coefficientsr(aCj b) andr(aCj b) – that constitute the
termsrw(aC b) andrw(aC b) – is a constant equal ton, i.e. the number of criteria
in F (see equation (2) in Definition 1). These coefficients may appear therefore as
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some kind of credibility distribution on the set of positive and negative significance
weights.
Suppose that the given pre-orderπ of significance of the criteria containsk
equivalence classes denotedπ(k+1), ..., π(2k) in increasing sequence. The same
equivalence classes, but in in reversed order, appearing on the “negating” signifi-
cance side, are denotedπ(1), ..., π(k).
Definition 7 (Repartition functions).
For each equivalence classπ(i), we denotew(i) the cumulated negating, respec-
tively confirming, significance of all equi-significant criteria gathered in this equiv-
alence class:
i = 1, ..., k : w(i) =
∑
gj∈π(i)




We denotec(i)(a, b) for i = 1, ..., k the sum of all coefficientsr(aCj b) such that
gj ∈ π(i) andc(i)(a, b) for i = k + 1, ..., 2k the sum of all coefficientsr(aCj b)
such thatgj ∈ π(i). Similarly, we denotec(i)(a, b) for i = 1, ..., k the sum of all
coefficientsr(aCj b) such thatgj ∈ π(i) andc(i)(a, b) for i = k + 1, ..., 2k the
sum of all coefficientsr(aCj b) such thatgj ∈ π(i).
With the help of this notation, we may rewrite implication (8) as follows:










c(i)(a, b) · w(i)
)
; ∀w ∈ W (π) ⇒ aCπ b.
(10)
Coefficientsc(i)(a, b) andc(i)(a, b) represent two distributions – one the negation
of the other – on an ordinal scale determined by the increasing significancew(i) of
the equivalence classes inπ(i).
2.2 Ordinal distributional dominance
We may thus test the left hand side inequality of implication (10) with the classi-
cal stochastic dominance principle originally introduced in the context of efficient
portfolio selection (see Hadar and Russel, 1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969).
We denoteC(i), respectivelyC(i), the increasing cumulative sums of coeffi-







c(i) ·w(i) ;∀w ∈ W (π) ⇔
{
C(i) 6 C(i), i = 1, ..., 2k;
∃i ∈ 1, ..., 2k : C(i) < C(i).
(11)
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Proof. Demonstration of this lemma (see for instance Fishburn, 1974) goes by
rewriting the right hand inequality of equivalence (10) with the help of the repar-
tition functionsC(i) andC(i). It readily appears then that the term by term differ-
ence of the cumulative sums is conveniently oriented by the right hand conditions
of equivalence (11).
This concludes the proof of our main result.
Theorem 1.
∀a, b ∈ A, let C(i)(a, b) represent the increasing cumulative sums of credibility
associated with a given significance ordering of the criteria:
aCπ b ⇐
{
C(i)(a, b) 6 C(i)(a, b), i = 1, ..., 2k and
∃i ∈ 1, ..., 2k : C(i)(a, b) < C(i)(a, b).
(12)
We observe an ordinal concordant outranking situationaCπ b between actionsa
andb as soon as the credibility repartition on the increasing significance ordering
of criteria in favour of “aS b” is strictly below the same repartition of criteria in
favour of its negation, i.e. “¬(aS b)”.
The preceding result gives us the operational key for testing for the presence
of a global outranking situation.
2.3 Testing for ordinal concordance
LetL3 = {fπ, u, tπ}, where:fπ meansrather false than truewith anyπ-compatible
weightsw, u meanslogically undeterminedand,tπ meansrather true than false
with anyπ-compatible weightsw. For each pair of decision actions evaluated in
the performance tableau, we may compute a corresponding truth-functional evalu-
ation representing truthfulness or falseness of the presence of ordinal concordance
in favour of a given outranking situation. Similar to the classic majority concor-
dance case ( see Definition 3), we here add explicitly the no veto requirement.
Definition 8 (Ordinal concordance test).
Let π be a significance ordering of the criteria.∀a, b ∈ A, let C(i)(a, b) and
C(i)(a, b) denote the corresponding cumulative sums of increasing sums of credi-
bility associated with relationC. We define a truth-functional evaluation of asser-
tion aS b, denotedJa S bKπ, based on relationsCπ andD and, taking values in
L3 as follows:
Ja S bKπ =

tπ if (aCπ b) ∧ (aD b) ;




Table 2.Assessing the assertion “m4 S m5”
π(i) -Price -Comfort -Speed, Design Speed,Design Comfort Price
c(i) 0 0 1 1 1 1
c(i) 1 1 1 1 0 0
C(i) 0 0 1 2 3 4
C(i) 1 2 3 4 4 4
Table 3.The ordinal concordance of the pairwise outranking
Jx S yKπ m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
m1 - tπ u u u u fπ
m2 tπ - tπ fπ u fπ u
m3 tπ tπ - fπ u fπ u
m4 tπ tπ tπ - tπ tπ fπ
m5 tπ tπ tπ tπ - tπ u
m6 tπ tπ tπ tπ tπ - tπ




C(i)(a, b) > C(i)(a, b), i = 1, ..., 2k
)
∧(
∃i ∈ 1, ..., 2k : C(i)(a, b) > C(i)(a, b)
)
.
Coming back to our simple example, we may now apply this test to the outrank-
ing situation between car modelsm4 andm5 for instance. In Table 2, we have
represented the six increasing equi-significance classes we observe. From Table 1
we may compute the credibilityc(i) (respectivelyc(i)) associated with the asser-
tion that modelm4 outranks (respectively does not outrank)m5, as well as the
corresponding cumulative distributionsC(i) andC(i) shown in Table 2.
Applying our test, we notice thatJm4 S m5Kπ = tπ, i.e. it is true that the
assertion “modelm4 outranks modelm5” will be supported by a more or less
significant majority of criteria for allπ-compatible sets of significance weights.
For information, we reproduce in Table 3 the completeJaS bKπ evaluation on
A×A. It is worthwhile noticing that – faithful with the general concordance prin-
ciple – the outranking statements “x S y” appearing with valuetπ are warranted
to bemore true than falsewith everyπ-compatible significance weights. Simi-
larly, those showing valuefπ are warranted to bemore false than truewith any
π-compatible significance weights. The other statements – appearing with cred-
ibility u – are to be consideredundetermined(see Bisdorff, 2000). Truthfulness
of the global outranking can in this case neither be rejected nor confirmed on the
level of the ordinal concordance test.
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Table 4.The cardinal majority concordance of the outranking of the car models
rw(x S y) m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
m1 - .83 .67 .67 .67 .67 .00
m2 .80 - .72 .47 .67 .47 .67
m3 .73 .73 - .75 .67 .67 .67
m4 .53 .53 .80 - .80 .63 .67
m5 .53 .73 .80 .80 - .72 .67
m6 .73 .73 .73 .73 .73 - .83
m7 .00 .00 .33 .53 .53 .60 -
As previously mentioned, modelm6 gives the unique dominant kernel, i.e. a
stable and dominant subset of the{fπ, u, tπ}-valued global outranking graph. This
decision action therefore represents a robust good choice decision candidate. It
appears to be arather true than falsegood choice with any possibleπ-compatible
set of significance weights (see Bisdorff and Roubens, 2004).
Furthermore, we may observe that both “extreme” models, namelym1 – the
most expensive one – andm7 – the cheapest one, appear in the unique absorbent
kernel, i.e. stable and absorbent subset of the same{fπ, u, tπ}-valued global out-
ranking graph. Thus, they constitute both bad choices with respect to with ordinal
concordance requirement.
Let us now address this robustness issue directly.
3 Analyzing the robustness of global outrankings
In this last section, we are going to integrate in a same logical framework, three
levels of concordance: simple majority – , ordinal – and unanimous concordance.
3.1 Three levels of concordance
Let us suppose that the decision maker has given a precise setw of significance
weights with underlying significance pre-orderπ. The classical majority concor-
dance approach will thus deliver an outranking indexrw(aSw b) onA×A.
In our car selection problem, the corresponding result is shown in Table 4.
We may notice here thatrw(m4 Sm5) = 80% andJm4 Sm5Kw = tw. But we
also know from our previous investigation thatJm4 Sm5Kπ = tπ. The outrank-
ing statement “m4 Sm5” is thus confirmed furthermore with anyπ-compatible
weights. Let us recall that thePrice criterion is the most significant, followed in a
second position by theComfortcriterion. Both theSpeedandDesigncriteria are
equally in the third position.
Going a step further, we could imagine aperfect car modelwhich is the cheap-
est, most comfortable, very fast and superiorly designed model, calledmtop. It is
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not difficult to see that this model will indeed dominate all the setA with unani-
mous concordance;∀x ∈ A and any possible weight setw, we will always have
rw(mtop Sx) > 50%. The outranking statements “mtop Sx” are indeed warranted
for any possible significance weight set and in particular also for allπ-compatible
ones.
Definition 9 (Unanimous concordance).
∀a, b ∈ A we say that “a unanimously outranksb”, denoted “a∆b”, if the out-
ranking assertion “aCj b” – semiotically restricted to each individual criterion
gj ∈ F – is rather true than false.
We capture once more the potential truthfulness of the dominance statement “aD b”
with the help of a truth-functional evaluation denotedJaS bK∆ based on the local
r(aCj b) indexes and taking its values inL3 = {f∆, u, t∆}, where:f∆ means
unanimously false, t∆ meansunanimously trueand,u meansundeterminedas
usual.
∀a, b ∈ A : JaS bK∆ =

t∆ if ∀gj ∈ F : r(aCj b) > 12 ;
f∆ if ∀gj ∈ F : r(aCj b) < 12 ;
u otherwise.
(14)
In our example, we observe a dominance situation between modelsm6 and
m4. On every criterion,m6 clearly outranksm4 (see Table 1).
We are now going to integrate all three truth-functional evaluations, i.e. the
unanimous, the ordinal and the majority concordance in a common logical frame-
work.
3.2 Integrating unanimous, ordinal and classical majority
concordance
Let w represent given numerical significance weights andπ the underlying signifi-
cance pre-order. We define the following ordinal sequence (increasing from falsity
to truth) of logical concordance degrees: –f∆ meansunanimous concordantly
false, – fπ meansordinal concordantly false with anyπ-compatible weights, – fw
meansmajority concordantly false with weightsw, – u meansundetermined, –
tw meansmajority concordantly true with weightsw, – tπ meansordinal concor-
dantly true with anyπ-compatible weightsand, –t∆ meansunanimous concor-
dantly true.
On the basis of a given performance tableau, we may thus evaluate the global
outranking relationS onA as follows:
Definition 10 (Robustness denotation of the global outranking).
LetL7 = {f∆, fπ, fw, u, tw, tπ, t∆}. ∀a, b ∈ A, we define a truth-functional eval-
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Table 5.Robustness of the outranking on the car models
Jx S yK m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
m1 - tπ tw tw tw tw f∆
m2 tπ - tπ fπ tw fπ tw
m3 tπ tπ - tw tw tw tw
m4 tπ tπ tπ - tπ tπ fπ
m5 tπ tπ tπ tπ - tπ tw
m6 tπ tπ tπ t∆ tπ - tπ
m7 f∆ f∆ fw tπ tπ fπ -
uationJaS bK ∈ L7 as follows:
JaS bK =

t∆ if JaS bK∆ = t∆ ;
tπ if (JaS bK∆ 6= t∆) ∧ (JaS bKπ = tπ) ;
tw if (JaS bKπ 6= tπ) ∧ (JaS bKw = tw) ;
f∆ if JaS bK∆ = f∆ ;
fπ if (JaS bK∆ 6= f∆) ∧ (JaS bKπ = fπ) ;
fw if (JaS bKπ 6= fπ) ∧ (JaS bKw = fw) ;
u otherwise.
(15)
On the seven car models, following Definition 10 we obtain the results shown
in Table 5. We notice in Linem6 that modelm6 outranks all other models at
tπ level. It appears therefore to be atπ-valued dominant kernel of this valued
outranking relation. All the same, both modelsm3 andm5 appear astw-valued
dominant kernels. And, if we apply our methodology for constructing good choices
from such aL7-valued outranking relation (see Bisdorff and Roubens, 2004) we
obtain a first good choice – modelm6 – at the ordinal concordance level and,
a second good choice – modelm3 – at the classic majority concordance level
depending on the precisely given numerical significance weights. In terms of a best
choice recommendation, it appears clearly that modelm3 represents a potential
good choice depending on the precisely given significance weights, whereas model
m6 appears to be a much more robust good choice in fact independent of any given
significance-order compatible weights.
Let us close our paper with the presentation of a real case study.
3.3 A robust best candidate for the EURO Best Poster Award 2004
Apart from the traditional contributed and invited presentations, the Programme
Committee of the 20th European Conference on Operational Research, Rhodes
2004, invited fordiscussion presentations– a new kind of EURO K conference
participation consisting in a 30 minutes presentation in front of a poster in the
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Table 6.Global outranking of the posters
rw(C) p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12 p13
p1 - .58 .24 .12 .46 .68 .34 .76 .65 .04 .63 .08 .28
p2 .42 - .34 .34 .34 .42 .42 .40 .61 .24 .45 .34 .26
p3 .82 .74 - .54 .66 .98 .86 .96 .69 .16 .81 .58 .46
p4 .98 .68 .62 - .76 .98 .82 .98 .69 .28 .75 .70 .54
p5 .64 .68 .72 .48 - 1.0 .78 .98 .69 .26 .75 .52 .0
p6 .54 .58 .10 .10 .34 - .42 .86 .65 .0 .63 .04 .0
p7 .68 .72 .32 .46 .30 .86 - .82 .65 .10 .69 .50 .36
p8 .50 .60 .16 .20 .30 .66 .40 - .71 .02 .67 .16 .0
p9 .43 .49 .35 .35 .41 .49 .37 .49 - .0 .39 .37 .35
p10 1.0 .80 1.0 .84 1.0 1.0 .90 1.0 .71 - .81 .88 .80
p11 .71 .61 .37 .29 .29 .43 .39 .59 .69 .0 - .31 .43
p12 .98 .66 .70 .62 .64 .96 .78 .94 .69 .32 .75 - .56
p13 1.0 .76 .70 .60 .80 .80 .70 .96 .69 .48 .81 .64 -
style of natural sciences conferences. In order to promote this new type of poster
presentations, EURO proposed a special Best Poster Award consisting of a diploma
and a prize of 1000e. Each contributor accepted in the category of the discussion
presentations was invited to submit a pdf image of his poster to a five member jury.
To evaluate the submitted poster images, the Programme Committee retained
the following preference dimensions:cientific quality(sq), contribution to OR
theory and/or practice(ctp), originality (orig) andpresentation quality(pq) in
decreasing order of importance. 13 candidates actually submitted a poster in due
time and the five jury members were asked to evaluate the 13 posters on each
dimension with the help of ordinal criteria functions using a scale 0 (very weak) to
10 (excellent). As usual in an ordinal context, indifference thresholds were set to
zero and the preference thresholds were set equal to one ordinal level difference.
All five jury members being officially equal in importance, we considered to
be in the presence of a consistent family of5× 4 = 20 criteria gathered into four
equi-significance classes listed hereafter in decreasing order of importance:
π(1) = {sq1, sq2, sq3, sq4, sq5},
π(2) = {pct1, pct2, pct3, pct4, pct5},
π(3) = {orig1, orig2, orig3, orig4, orig5},
π(4) = {pq1, pq2, pq3, pq4, pq5}.
The cardinal significance weights associated with these four classes of equi-
significant criteria were rather arbitrarily chosen as follows:sqi = 4, wctpi = 3,
worigi = 2 andwpqi = 1, for i = 1 to 4.
We are faced with the decision problem of selecting the best – in the sense
of the preference dimensions retained by the Programme Committee – out of the
13 posters on the basis of a given performance tableau. We may first computed
the credibility indexrw of the concordant outranking relationC shown in Table 6
using the significance weight setw above. No veto situations being expressed by
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Table 7.Robust outranking of the posters
JSK p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12 p13
p1 - tπ fπ fπ fw tπ fπ tπ tπ fπ tπ fπ fπ
p2 fπ - fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ tπ fπ fw fπ fπ
p3 tπ tπ - tw tw tπ tπ tπ tπ fπ tπ tw fw
p4 tπ tπ tπ - tπ tπ tπ tπ tπ fw tπ tπ tπ
p5 tπ tπ tπ fw - t∆ tπ tπ tπ fπ tπ tw f∆
p6 tw tπ fπ fπ fπ - fπ tπ tπ f∆ tπ fπ f∆
p7 tπ tπ fπ fw fπ tπ - tπ tπ fπ tπ u fπ
p8 u tπ fπ fπ fπ tπ fπ - tπ fπ tπ fπ f∆
p9 fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ - f∆ fπ fπ fπ
p10 t∆ tπ t∆ tπ t∆ t∆ tπ t∆ tπ - tπ tπ tπ
p11 tπ tπ fπ fπ fπ fπ fπ tπ tπ f∆ - fπ fπ
p12 tπ tπ tπ tw tπ tπ tπ tπ tπ fw tπ - tπ
p13 t∆ tπ tπ tw tπ tπ tπ tπ tπ fw tπ tπ -
the members of the jury, the concordance levelsrw(C) shown in Table 6 represent
directly the credibility indexrw(S) of the global outranking relationS.
Careful inspection of this outranking index – line by line – makes it apparent
that posterp10 represents obviously the best candidate. It alone concordantly out-
ranks all other posters with a comfortable weighted significance of at least 71%
(see Table 6 Linep10). This makes it undoubtedly the unique kernel of the global
concordant outranking relation. In addition, we may notice the observed1.0 figures
that appear in Table 6. They indicate unanimous (100%) concordance situations in
favour ofxS y – so,rw(p10 S p6) = 1.0 . Similarly, .0 figures (see Linep13 for in-
stance) indicate unanimous concordanceagainstxS y – such asrw(p6 S p10) = 0.
The question we must ask at this point is whether this precise concordant out-
ranking may not appear as an artifact induced by our more or less arbitrarily chosen
cardinal significance weights:{4, 3, 2, 1} ?
To check this issue, we computed – following our methodology – the robust-
ness degreesJSK of the global outranking statements shown in Table 7. Inspecting
Line p10, we notice that the previous results become positively confirmed. Indeed,
with a robustness degree oftπ, i.e. rather true than false with anyπ-compatible
weights, posterp10 is confirmed in the first position. There is even evidence that
p10 effectively dominates, i.e. unanimously outranks postersp1, p3, p5, p6 andp8.
On the other hand, looking at Columnp10 of Table 7, we also notice that no other
poster concordantly outranksp10. Here, the judges again unanimously rejected the
outranking ofp6 andp11 overp10.
Selecting posterp10 for the EURO Best Paper Award 20044 appeared therefore
totally independent of the choice of any precise numerical significance weights
4 Posterp10 on Political Districting via Weighted Voronoı̈ Regionswas submitted by Federica
RICCA, Bruno SIMEONE and Isabella LARI from the University of Rome “La Sapienza”. Congratu-
lations.
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compatible with the given importance ordering of the four preference dimensions
retained by the Programme Committee.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a formal approach for assessing truthfulness of
binary outranking statements on the basis of a performance tableau involving cri-
teria of solely ordinal significance. The concept of ordinal concordance is intro-
duced and a formal testing procedure based on distributional dominance is devel-
oped. Thus, we solve a major practical problem concerning the precise numerical
knowledge of the individual significance weights that is required by the classical
majority concordance principle as implemented in theELECTRE methods. Appli-
cability of the concordance based aggregation of preference is extended to the
case where only ordinal significance of the criteria is available. Furthermore, even
if precise numerical significance is available, we provide a robustness analysis of
the observed preferences by integrating unanimous, ordinal and simple majority
concordance in a same logical framework.
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